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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20444
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
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dc.contributor.author | Peter, Klara Sabirianova | en |
dc.contributor.author | Earle, John S. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:14:09Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:14:09Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20444 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We present a model of neighborhood effects in wage payment delays. Positive feedbackarises because each employer?s arrears affect the late payment costs faced by other firms inthe same local labor market, resulting in a strategic complementarity in the practice. Themodel is estimated on panel data for workers and firms in Russia, facilitating identificationthrough the use of a rich set of covariates and fixed effects at the level of the employee, theemployer, and the local labor market. We also exploit a policy intervention affecting publicsector workers that provides an instrumental variable to estimate the endogenous reaction inthe non-public sector. Consistently across specifications, the estimated reaction functiondisplays strongly positive neighborhood effects, and the estimates of four feedback loops – operating through worker quits, effort, strikes, and legal penalties – imply that costs of delaysare attenuated by neighborhood arrears. We also study a nonlinear case exhibiting twostable equilibria: a ?punctual payment equilibrium? and a ?late payment equilibrium.? Theestimates imply that the theoretical conditions for multiple equilibria under symmetric locallabor market competition are satisfied in our data. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x1198 | en |
dc.subject.jel | A12 | en |
dc.subject.jel | B52 | en |
dc.subject.jel | P37 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J30 | en |
dc.subject.jel | O17 | en |
dc.subject.jel | P31 | en |
dc.subject.jel | K42 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L14 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | wage arrears | en |
dc.subject.keyword | contract violation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | neighborhood effect | en |
dc.subject.keyword | social interactions | en |
dc.subject.keyword | multiple equilibria | en |
dc.subject.keyword | network externality | en |
dc.subject.keyword | strategic complementarity | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lohn | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verbindlichkeiten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Vergütungssystem | en |
dc.subject.stw | Nachbarschaftsökonomie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Übergangswirtschaft | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Schätzung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Russland | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lohnrückstände | en |
dc.title | Contract Violations, Neighborhood Effects, and Wage Arrears in Russia | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 390563285 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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