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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Pissarides, Christopher A. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:14:00Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:14:00Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20423 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper derives optimal employment contracts when workers are risk averse and there areemployment and unemployment risks. Without income insurance, consumption rises duringemployment and falls during unemployment. Optimal employment contracts offer severancecompensation and sometimes give notice before dismissal. Severance compensationsmoothes consumption during employment but dismissal delays insure partially against theunemployment risk because of moral hazard. During the delay consumption falls to giveincentives to the worker to search for another job. No dismissal delays are optimal ifexogenous unemployment compensation is sufficiently generous. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x1183 | en |
dc.subject.jel | E24 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J32 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J33 | en |
dc.subject.jel | E21 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | employment risk | en |
dc.subject.keyword | unemployment risk | en |
dc.subject.keyword | severance compensation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | notice of dismissal | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsvertrag | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitslosenversicherung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitslosigkeit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Risiko | en |
dc.subject.stw | Konsum | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitskräfte | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsmarkttheorie | en |
dc.title | Consumption and Savings with Unemployment Risk : Implications for Optimal Employment Contracts | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 389194298 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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