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dc.contributor.authorGlazer, Amihaien
dc.contributor.authorGersbach, Hansen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:13:41Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:13:41Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20380-
dc.description.abstractWe consider a firm which pays a worker for his effort over several periods. The more the firmpays in one period, the wealthier the worker is in the following periods, and so the more hemust be paid for a given effort. This wealth effect can induce an employer to pay little initiallyand more later on. For related reasons, the worker may work harder than the employerprefers. The incentive contracts firms offer may therefore cap the worker?s earnings. Lastly,this wealth ratchet effect can induce excessive firing and turnover.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1143en
dc.subject.jelJ60en
dc.subject.jelJ30en
dc.subject.jelD80en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordprincipal-agenten
dc.subject.keywordcompensationen
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden
dc.subject.keywordwealth effectsen
dc.subject.keywordRatchet effectsen
dc.subject.keywordhigh-powered incentivesen
dc.subject.stwVergütungssystemen
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen
dc.subject.stwVermögenseffekten
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmobilitäten
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleHigh Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn386980365en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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