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dc.contributor.authorSliwka, Dirken
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:11:36Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:11:36Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20099-
dc.description.abstractThe costs of vertical integration are analyzed within a game-theoretic signaling model. It is shown that a company when being vertically integrated with a supplier may well decide to buy certain components from this supplier even at a lower quality than that offered by external sources. When the parent company decides to stop buying components from the integrated supplier, the value of the ownership share in the supplier is reduced: On the onehand, the supplier?s profit from the transactions with its parent is foregone. But on the other hand, other clients may decide against buying from this supplier as the latter?s reputation for providing an appropriate quality is damaged. The loss in value of the ownership share may outweigh the loss due to the lower quality. The anticipation of this effect leads to reduced exante incentives for the supplier?s management to raise quality. A spin-off may therefore be beneficial as it strengthens incentives. Costs and benefits of vertical integration are analyzed and consequences for vertically integrated companies organized in profit centers are discussed.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x856en
dc.subject.jelM55en
dc.subject.jelL22en
dc.subject.jelC22en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordvertical integrationen
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen
dc.subject.keywordoutsourcingen
dc.subject.keywordsignalingen
dc.subject.stwVertikale Konzentrationen
dc.subject.stwLieferanten-Kunden-Beziehungen
dc.subject.stwOutsourcingen
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen
dc.subject.stwProduktqualitäten
dc.subject.stwSignallingen
dc.subject.stwPrestigeen
dc.subject.stwUnternehmenswerten
dc.subject.stwKosten-Nutzen-Analyseen
dc.subject.stwProfit Centeren
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleManagement Incentives, Signaling Effects and the Costs of Vertical Integration-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn368840859en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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