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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 503
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
his paper surveys models of voting on redistribution. Under reasonable assumptions, the baseline model produces an equilibrium with the extent of redistributive taxation chosen by the median income earner; if the median is poorer than average, redistribution is from rich to poor. Increasing inequality increases redistribution. However, under diŽerent assumptions about the economic environment, redistribution may not be simply rich to poor, and inequality need not increase redistribution. Several lines of argument are presented, in particular, political participation, public provision of private goods, public pensions, and tax avoidance or evasion.
Schlagwörter: 
inequality
redistribution
voting
JEL: 
O15
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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