Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/102718 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 162
Publisher: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Abstract: 
We re-examine the view that a ban on price discrimination in input markets is particularly desirable in the presence of buyer power. This argument crucially depends on an inverse relationship between downstream firms' profits and the uniform input price. Assuming different input efficiencies among downstream firms, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition such that a higher input price benefits a subset of relatively efficient downstream firms. In such instances, consumers may be better off if discriminatory pricing is feasible.
Subjects: 
Price discrimination
Buyer Power
Raising Rivals’ Costs
JEL: 
L13
D43
K31
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-161-8
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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