Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/77852 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Citation: 
[Journal:] Health Economics Review [ISSN:] 2191-1991 [Volume:] 3 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Year:] 2013 [Pages:] 1-13
Publisher: 
Springer, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
This article comprehensively examines the impact of recent smoking control policies in Japan, increases in cigarette taxes and the enforcement of the Health Promotion Law, on individual smoking choice by using multi-year and nationwide individual survey data to overcome the analytical problems of previous Japanese studies. In the econometric analyses, I specify a simple binary choice model based on a random utility model to examine the effects of smoking control policies on individual smoking choice by employing the instrumental variable probit model to control for the endogeneity of cigarette prices. The empirical results show that an increase in cigarette prices statistically significantly reduces the smoking probability of males by 1.0 percent and that of females by 1.4 to 2.0 percent. The enforcement of the Health Promotion Law has a statistically significant effect on reducing the smoking probability of males by 15.2 percent and of females by 11.9 percent. Furthermore, an increase in cigarette prices has a statistically significant negative effect on the smoking probability of office workers, non-workers, male manual workers, and female unemployed people, and the enforcement of the Health Promotion Law has a statistically significant effect on decreasing the smoking probabilities of office workers, female manual workers, and male non-workers.
Subjects: 
smoking
cigarette tax/price increase
The Health Promotion Law
Instrumental variable probit model
Japan
JEL: 
C25
C26
I18
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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