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dc.contributor.authorZhou, Yanen
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-14-
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-21T11:55:59Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-21T11:55:59Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64123-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates empirically the relationship between the pattern of fiscal policy and the demand for international reserves in developing countries, and how this relationship is associated with political risk and conditional access to global capital markets. It finds evidence that for developing countries with low political risk, countercyclical (procyclical) fiscal policies are associated with higher (lower) international reserve holdings in economic downturns. The relationship is stronger when the countries with low political risk rely heavily on external financing. For developing countries with high political risk, the link between reserves holdings and fiscal policy pattern is not clear-cut.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of California, Santa Cruz Institute for International Economics (SCIIE) |cSanta Cruz, CAen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x06-18en
dc.subject.jelC23en
dc.subject.jelE62en
dc.subject.jelF34en
dc.subject.jelF41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordinternational reservesen
dc.subject.keywordfiscal policyen
dc.subject.keywordpolitical risken
dc.subject.stwWährungsreservenen
dc.subject.stwInternationaler Krediten
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken
dc.subject.stwInternationaler Finanzmarkten
dc.subject.stwLänderrisikoen
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsländeren
dc.titleInternational reserves and fiscal policy in developing countries-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn60464065Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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