Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/64078 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWalsh, Carl E.en
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-17-
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-21T11:55:00Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-21T11:55:00Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64078-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, I revisit an old question in the analysis of monetary policy that was first studied by Rogoff (1985) - should central banks pursue objectives that differ systematically from social welfare? I investigate how the answer to this question is affected by the degree of transparency that characterizes monetary policy. When the policy regime is one of discretion and the central bank is opaque, changes in the policy instrument have informational effects that distort the central bank's incentives and generate policy biases. Directing the central bank to place more weight on inflation stabilization, i.e., to implement a less flexible inflation targeting policy, can offset this distortion and lead to lower social loss. In contrast, the objectives of a transparent central bank should coincide with those of society. However, outcomes under transparency may be dominated by those produced by an opaque and conservative (i.e., less flexible) central bank.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of California, Santa Cruz Institute for International Economics (SCIIE) |cSanta Cruz, CAen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x10-17en
dc.subject.jelE52en
dc.subject.jelE58en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordtransparencyen
dc.subject.keywordmonetary policyen
dc.subject.keywordinflation targetingen
dc.titleTransparency, the opacity bias, and optimal flexible inflation targeting-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn640014518en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
172.67 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.