Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62787 
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dc.contributor.authorPancs, Romansen
dc.contributor.authorVriend, Nicolaas J.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T12:58:39Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T12:58:39Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62787-
dc.description.abstractSchelling [1969, 1971a, 1971b, 1978] presented a microeconomic model showing how an integrated city could unravel to a rather segregated city, notwithstanding relatively mild assumptions concerning the individual agents' preferences, i.e., no agent preferring the resulting segregation. We examine the robustness of Schelling's model, focusing in particular on its driving force: the individual preferences. We show that even if all individual agents have a strict preference for perfect integration, best-response dynamics will lead to segregation. What is more, we argue that the one-dimensional and two-dimensional versions of Schelling's spatial proximity model are in fact two qualitatively very different models of segregation.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aQueen Mary University of London, Department of Economics |cLondonen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x487en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelD62en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordNeighborhood segregation, Myopic Nash Equilibria, Best-response dynamics, Markov chain, Limit-behavioren
dc.subject.stwWohnstandorten
dc.subject.stwPräferenztheorieen
dc.subject.stwMarkovscher Prozessen
dc.subject.stwSegregationen
dc.titleSchelling's spatial proximity model of segregation revisited-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn377037621en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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