Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57783 
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dc.contributor.authorBerger, Allen N.en
dc.contributor.authorKick, Thomasen
dc.contributor.authorKoetter, Michaelen
dc.contributor.authorSchaeck, Klausen
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-03-
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-09T10:00:18Z-
dc.date.available2012-05-09T10:00:18Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86558-787-9en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57783-
dc.description.abstractSocial capital theory predicts individuals establish social ties based on homophily, i.e., affinities for similar others. We exploit a unique sample to analyze how similarities and social ties affect career outcomes in banking based on age, education, gender, and employment history to examine if homophily and connectedness increase the probability that the appointee to an executive board is an outsider (an individual without previous employment at the bank) compared to being an insider. Our results show that homophily based on age and gender raises the chance of the successful candidate being an outsider, whereas similar educational backgrounds reduce the chance that the appointee comes from outside. When we examine performance effects, we find weak evidence that social ties are associated with reduced profitability.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aDeutsche Bundesbank |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper Series 2 |x2011,18en
dc.subject.jelG21en
dc.subject.jelG32en
dc.subject.jelG34en
dc.subject.jelJ16en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSocial networksen
dc.subject.keywordexecutive careersen
dc.subject.keywordbankingen
dc.subject.keywordcorporate governanceen
dc.titleDoes it pay to have friends? Social ties and executive appointments in banking-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn715112015en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bubdp2:201118en

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