Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57561 
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dc.contributor.authorHausman, Daniel M.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-12-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T15:44:45Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T15:44:45Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57561-
dc.description.abstractContemporary mainstream normative economists assess policies in terms of their capacities to satisfy preferences, though most would concede that other factors such as freedom, rights, and justice are also relevant. Why should policy be responsive to preferences? This essay argues that the best reason is that people's preferences are in some circumstances good evidence of what will benefit them. When those circumstances do not obtain and preferences are not good evidence of welfare, there is little reason to satisfy preferences.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPapers on Economics and Evolution |x1124en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwPräferenztheorieen
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftspolitiken
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwKritiken
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleWhy satisfy preferences?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn68292167Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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