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dc.contributor.authorMiettinen, Topien
dc.contributor.authorRopponen, Ollien
dc.contributor.authorSääskilahti, Pekkaen
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-09-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:28:29Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:28:29Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56834-
dc.description.abstractWe exploit a controlled frameless laboratory experiment to study settlement negotiations and the plaintiff's decision to raise a lawsuit in case of an impasse. We find that greater variance in court outcomes increases the litigation rate and lowers the settlement rate. This latter finding goes against the received wisdom and earlier experimental evidence (Ashenfelter et al. 1992) that greater risk in arbitration outcomes increases the settlement rate. We find that self-serving biases about the protagonist' course of action are accountable for the lower settlement rate, while an impasse payoff inferior to that of the defendant induces the plaintiffs to excessive risk-taking in an attempt to narrow the gap.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2011,022en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC9en
dc.subject.jelK41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordbargainingen
dc.subject.keywordlitigationen
dc.subject.keywordloss-aversionen
dc.subject.keywordself-serving biasen
dc.subject.keywordsettlementen
dc.subject.stwZivilprozessen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungenen
dc.subject.stwRisikopräferenzen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.titleGambling for the upper hand: Settlement negotiations in the lab-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn657470880en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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