Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56834
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Miettinen, Topi | en |
dc.contributor.author | Ropponen, Olli | en |
dc.contributor.author | Sääskilahti, Pekka | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-05-09 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-04-11T09:28:29Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-04-11T09:28:29Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56834 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We exploit a controlled frameless laboratory experiment to study settlement negotiations and the plaintiff's decision to raise a lawsuit in case of an impasse. We find that greater variance in court outcomes increases the litigation rate and lowers the settlement rate. This latter finding goes against the received wisdom and earlier experimental evidence (Ashenfelter et al. 1992) that greater risk in arbitration outcomes increases the settlement rate. We find that self-serving biases about the protagonist' course of action are accountable for the lower settlement rate, while an impasse payoff inferior to that of the defendant induces the plaintiffs to excessive risk-taking in an attempt to narrow the gap. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJena | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aJena Economic Research Papers |x2011,022 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C9 | en |
dc.subject.jel | K41 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | bargaining | en |
dc.subject.keyword | litigation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | loss-aversion | en |
dc.subject.keyword | self-serving bias | en |
dc.subject.keyword | settlement | en |
dc.subject.stw | Zivilprozess | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verhandlungen | en |
dc.subject.stw | Risikopräferenz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Test | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.title | Gambling for the upper hand: Settlement negotiations in the lab | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 657470880 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Datei(en):
Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.