Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56529 
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dc.contributor.authorDadasov, Raminen
dc.contributor.authorHarms, Philippen
dc.contributor.authorLorz, Oliveren
dc.date.accessioned2010-04-20-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-04T13:54:59Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-04T13:54:59Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56529-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the influence of financial integration on institutional quality. We construct a dynamic political-economic model of an autocracy in which a ruling elite uses its political power to expropriate the general population. Although financial integration reduces capital costs for entrepreneurs and thereby raises gross incomes in the private sector, the elite may counteract this effect by increasing the level of expropriation. Since de facto political power is linked to economic resources, financial integration also has long-run consequences for the distribution of power and for the rise of an entrepreneurial class.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aPhilipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics |cMarburgen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics |x14-2010en
dc.subject.jelF21en
dc.subject.jelO16en
dc.subject.jelP48en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordinstitutionsen
dc.subject.keywordcapital mobilityen
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen
dc.subject.stwKapitalmarktliberalisierungen
dc.subject.stwKapitalmobilitäten
dc.subject.stwMachten
dc.subject.stwAutoritäres Systemen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleFinancial integration in autocracies: Greasing the wheel or more to steal?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn623986167en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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