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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Tillmann, Peter | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-11 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-04-04T13:49:43Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-04-04T13:49:43Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56500 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve consists of voting- and non-voting members. Apart from deciding about interest rate policy, members individually formulate regular inflation forecasts. This paper uncovers systematic differences in individual inflation forecasts submitted by voting and non-voting members. Based on a data set with individual forecasts recently made available it is shown that non-voters systematically overpredict inflation relative to the consensus forecast if they favor tighter policy and underpredict inflation if the favor looser policy. These findings are consistent with non-voting member following strategic motives in forecasting, i.e. non-voting members use their forecast to influence policy deliberation. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aPhilipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics |cMarburg | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aMAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics |x17-2010 | en |
dc.subject.jel | E43 | en |
dc.subject.jel | E52 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | inflation forecast | en |
dc.subject.keyword | forecast errors | en |
dc.subject.keyword | monetary policy | en |
dc.subject.keyword | monetary committee | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Federal Reserve | en |
dc.subject.stw | Geldpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gruppenentscheidung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Inflation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Prognose | en |
dc.subject.stw | Manipulation | en |
dc.subject.stw | USA | en |
dc.title | Strategic forecasting on the FOMC | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 625900308 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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