Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56208 
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dc.contributor.authorHuck, Steffenen
dc.contributor.authorKübler, Dorotheaen
dc.contributor.authorWeibull, Jörgenen
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-28-
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:06:14Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:06:14Z-
dc.date.issued2001-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56208-
dc.description.abstractThis paper deals with the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We outline a simple model of team production and provide preliminary results on linear incentive schemes in the presence of a social norm that may cause multiple equilibria. The effect of the social norm on the optimal bonus rate is discussed, as well as the effectiveness of temporary changes in the bonus rate as a means to move a firm from a bad to a good equilibrium.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aStockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI) |cStockholmen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x466en
dc.subject.jelD23en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordsocial normsen
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen
dc.subject.keywordcontractsen
dc.titleSocial norms and optimal incentives in firms-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn68759765Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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