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dc.contributor.authorLarrauri, Iván M. Lucichen
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-08-
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-10T10:53:22Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-10T10:53:22Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55215-
dc.description.abstractUsing the budget-based scheme approach developed by Kirby et.al. (1991) and Reichelstein (1992), this paper establishes the optimal policy function in order to control hidden actions from managers of Public Water Utilities (PWU) regarding investments that deviate from the Optimized Business Plan (OBP), with the purpose of inducing managers to reduce deviation from the execution of not programmed investments in the OBP and from programmed investments that were not executed. We find a high percentage of investment (47%) that deviates from its OBP. However between 16% and 35% of executed investment that it deviates from its programmation, can be controlled by the PWU manager with a compensation payment schemes.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHelmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung (UFZ) |cLeipzigen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aUFZ Discussion Paper |x02/2012en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwWasserwirtschaften
dc.subject.stwInvestitionspolitiken
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsentgelten
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Investitionspolitiken
dc.subject.stwPeruen
dc.titleIncentive scheme based on investment plan compliance for public water utilities in Peru-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn684930951en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ufzdps:022012en

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