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dc.contributor.authorAndreas, Jörn Michaelen
dc.contributor.authorRapp, Marc Steffenen
dc.contributor.authorWolff, Michaelen
dc.date.accessioned2010-10-07-
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-18T08:59:41Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-18T08:59:41Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/48435-
dc.description.abstractBuilding on a unique panel data set of German Prime Standard companies for the period 2005-2008, this paper investigates the influencing factors of both director compensation levels and structure, i.e. the probability of performance-based compensation. Drawing on agency theory arguments and previous literature, we analyze a comprehensive group of determinants, including detailed corporate performance, ownership and board characteristics. While controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, we find director compensation to be set in ways consistent with optimal contracting theory. I.e. compensation is systematically structured to mitigate agency conflicts and to encourage effective monitoring. Thus, our results indicate that similar types of agency conflicts exist in the German two-tier setting.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aTechnische Universität München, Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS) |cMünchenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x2010-06en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelG30en
dc.subject.jelG34en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordDirector Compensationen
dc.subject.keywordCorporate Governanceen
dc.subject.keywordOutside Directorsen
dc.subject.keywordTwo-tier Systemen
dc.subject.keywordAgency Costsen
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen
dc.subject.stwVergütungssystemen
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen
dc.subject.stwVertragstheorieen
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen
dc.titleDeterminants of director compensation in two-tier systems: evidence from German panel data-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn63630809Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cefswp:201006en

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