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dc.contributor.authorPuppe, Clemensen
dc.contributor.authorTasnádi, Attilaen
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-09-
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-23T09:50:05Z-
dc.date.available2011-05-23T09:50:05Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.pidoi:10.5445/IR/1000022998en
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:swb:90-229984en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/45634-
dc.description.abstractIn a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts one party can win, given the distribution of individual votes (the 'optimal gerrymandering rule'). As a corollary, we obtain that no districting rule can satisfy our axioms and treat parties symmetrically.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aKarlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON) |cKarlsruheen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aKIT Working Paper Series in Economics |x24en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keyworddistrictingen
dc.subject.keywordgerrymanderingen
dc.titleAxiomatic districting-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn657459097en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:kitwps:24en

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