Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45494
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dc.contributor.authorSchalast, Christophen_US
dc.contributor.authorBuxkaemper, Mariusen_US
dc.contributor.authorBüchler, Christianen_US
dc.contributor.authorWedel, Gregoren_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-12T09:36:28Z-
dc.date.available2011-05-12T09:36:28Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/45494-
dc.description.abstractSince years, incentives for the management have become a standard upon acquisitions of companies by Private Equity Investors - so-called Buy-Outs. However, until this date there are no empirical studies available on the arrangements of management participations and potential conflicts of interest especially on occasion of sales from one Private Equity Investor to another - so-called Secondary Buy-Outs. This present study is based on a survey among Private Equity Investors and Management Teams in companies controlled by Private Equity Investors. It shows a high degree of sensibility of all parties concerned for the issue of incentives and the potential conflict of interest involved with it. It also showed that market standards for management incentives have developed in the meantime. In practice, the instrument to prevent conflicts is therefore the transparency of the transaction. The only way to prevent criminal and civil consequences (damages) for the managers involved, as well as obstructing or even frustrating the process as a whole, is an open and transparent communication about the selling process and possible concepts of incentives between all parties concerned, i.e. seller, buyer and the management involved. Despite the frequency of such transactions there are - until today - no market standards or guide lines for this necessary transparency. The present study intends to create initial groundwork for this.en_US
dc.language.isogeren_US
dc.publisher|aFrankfurt School of Finance & Management |cFrankfurt, M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking paper series // Frankfurt School of Finance & Management |x161en_US
dc.subject.jelK12en_US
dc.subject.jelK19en_US
dc.subject.jelK22en_US
dc.subject.jelK29en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordManagement Buy-Outen_US
dc.subject.keywordMBOen_US
dc.subject.keywordManagement Buy-Inen_US
dc.subject.keywordMBIen_US
dc.subject.keywordLeveraged Buy-Outen_US
dc.subject.keywordPrivate Equityen_US
dc.subject.keywordSecondary Buy-Outen_US
dc.subject.keywordManagementbeteiligungen_US
dc.subject.keywordBeteiligungsvertragen_US
dc.subject.keywordBad-Leaver/Good-Leaveren_US
dc.subject.keywordInteressenkonflikten_US
dc.subject.keywordBeteiligungsquoteen_US
dc.subject.keywordGarantienen_US
dc.subject.keywordExiten_US
dc.subject.keywordIncentivierungen_US
dc.subject.keywordReportingen_US
dc.subject.keywordTransparenzen_US
dc.titleIncentivierung des Managements bei Unternehmenskäufen/Buy-Outs mit Private Equity Investoren - eine empirische Untersuchungen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn657397342en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fsfmwp:161-

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