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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43667
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Dewenter, Ralf | en |
dc.contributor.author | Haucap, Justus | en |
dc.contributor.author | Wenzel, Tobias | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-11-26 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-01-05T10:59:24Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-01-05T10:59:24Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.isbn | 978-3-86304-010-9 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43667 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper explores the effects that collusion can have in newspaper markets where firms compete for advertising as well as for readership. We compare three modes of competition: i) competition in the advertising and the reader market, ii) semi-collusion over advertising (with competition in the reader market), and iii) (full) collusion in both the advertising and the reader market. We find that semi-collusion leads to less advertising (but higher advertising prices) and lower copy prices which is beneficial for readers. Under certain circumstances, semi-collusion may even benefit advertisers as newspaper circulation is higher. In addition, total welfare may rise due to semi-collusion. Results under full collusion are ambiguous. However, even under full collusion newspaper copy prices may decrease and welfare may increase. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aHeinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) |cDüsseldorf | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aDICE Discussion Paper |x11 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L40 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L82 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D43 | en |
dc.subject.jel | K21 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Media Markets | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Collusion | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Two-Sided Markets | en |
dc.subject.stw | Zeitung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Medienökonomik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wohlfahrtseffekt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Semi-collusion in media markets | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 640630219 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:dicedp:11 | en |
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