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dc.contributor.authorSchüle, Tobiasen
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-21-
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-24T14:42:36Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-24T14:42:36Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-22497en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/40335-
dc.description.abstractEmpirical evidence suggests that banks often engage in refinancing of intrinsically insolvent debtors instead of writing of their non-performing loans. Such forbearance lending may induce soft budget constraints for the debtors, as it diminishes their incentives to thwart default. This paper introduces a model of coordination failure to analyze how a relationship bank affects the incidence of forbearance lending and soft budget constraints by signaling its credit decision to other creditors. We find that the relationship bank's signaling ability enhances its incentives to engage in forbearance lending and infuences the conditions under which debtors face soft budget constraints.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aEberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |cTübingenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aTübinger Diskussionsbeiträge |x303en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelG21en
dc.subject.jelG33en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcoordination failureen
dc.subject.keywordglobal gamesen
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen
dc.subject.keywordforbearance lendingen
dc.subject.keywordsoft budget constraintsen
dc.subject.stwKreditgeschäften
dc.subject.stwZahlungsunfähigkeiten
dc.subject.stwBudgetrestriktionen
dc.subject.stwAbschreibungen
dc.subject.stwSignallingen
dc.subject.stwGläubigeren
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.titleForbearance lending and soft budget constraints in a model of multiple heterogeneous bank financing-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn558780997en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:tuedps:303en

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