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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39435
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Hehenkamp, Burkhard | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-11-02 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-08-31T12:14:54Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-08-31T12:14:54Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39435 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Investigating the strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action monotonic games, we derive characterizing conditions both for general action monotonic games and for the subclass of action monotonic games with spillovers. Examples demonstrate the generality of our findings, in particular that the strategic advantage prevails beyond the classes of super- and submodular games. The application of two-player rent-seeking contests illustrates how our criteria simplify analyzing the strategic advantage. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aUniversität Dortmund, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät |cDortmund | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge |x05-05 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C79 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | strategic advantage | en |
dc.subject.keyword | interdependent preferences | en |
dc.subject.keyword | spillovers | en |
dc.subject.keyword | action monotonicity | en |
dc.title | The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action-monotonic games | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 611993929 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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