Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39435 
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dc.contributor.authorHehenkamp, Burkharden
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-02-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-31T12:14:54Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-31T12:14:54Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39435-
dc.description.abstractInvestigating the strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action monotonic games, we derive characterizing conditions both for general action monotonic games and for the subclass of action monotonic games with spillovers. Examples demonstrate the generality of our findings, in particular that the strategic advantage prevails beyond the classes of super- and submodular games. The application of two-player rent-seeking contests illustrates how our criteria simplify analyzing the strategic advantage.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität Dortmund, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät |cDortmunden
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge |x05-05en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelC79en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordstrategic advantageen
dc.subject.keywordinterdependent preferencesen
dc.subject.keywordspilloversen
dc.subject.keywordaction monotonicityen
dc.titleThe strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action-monotonic games-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn611993929en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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