Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37517 
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dc.contributor.authorGerrits, Carstenen
dc.contributor.authorBeckmann, Klausen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T09:03:47Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T09:03:47Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37517-
dc.description.abstractIt is the prevailing approach in the public choice literature to model lobbying and corruption in the same manner. On the contrary, we attempt to capture both in the same framework (auction theory), but using different modelling approaches. We present a unified framework in which some interesting conclusions ensue, not the least the possibility of a benign view on corruption as in Besley (2006).en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Political Economy: Lobbying and Preferences |xE17-V2en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD73en
dc.subject.jelK42en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.titleAuctioning off a favour: corruption and lobbying in a combo model-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn65515910Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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