Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37483 
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dc.contributor.authorSchneider, Maiken
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T09:09:26Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T09:09:26Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37483-
dc.description.abstractWe examine lobby influence on policy outcomes in a legislative vote-buying model with two competing lobbyists and endogenous policy proposals. We compare two polar cases: (1) the committee or (2) the lobbyist seeking policy change writes the bill. Surprisingly we find that if the salience of the issue is low, the committee proposes more extreme policy changes than the pro-policy-change lobbyist even though the policy preferences of the committee are more moderate. The opposite is true if salience is high. We also show that the extreme proposals when salience is low do not necessarily involve lower welfare relative to the lobbyist's proposal.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Political Economy: Lobbying and Preferences |xE17-V1en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelP16en
dc.subject.jelD70en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordlegislative lobbyingen
dc.subject.keywordvote buyingen
dc.subject.keywordlegislaturesen
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen
dc.titleBlackmailing Lobbyists-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn654890250en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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