Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37429 
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dc.contributor.authorNormann, Hans-Theoen
dc.contributor.authorJeitschko, Thomasen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T09:10:51Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T09:10:51Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37429-
dc.description.abstractWe contrast a standard deterministic signaling game with one where the signal-generating mechanism is stochastic. With stochastic signals a unique equilibrium emerges that involves separation and has intuitive comparative-static properties as the degree of signaling depends on the prior type distribution. With deterministic signals both pooling and separating configurations occur. Laboratory data support the theory: In the stochastic variant, there is more signaling behavior than with deterministic signals, and less frequent types distort their signals relatively more. Moreover, the degree of congruence between equilibrium and subject behavior is greater in stochastic settings compared to deterministic treatments.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Game Theory and Applications |xB13-V3en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordexperimentsen
dc.subject.keywordnoiseen
dc.subject.keywordsignallingen
dc.subject.keywordlearningen
dc.subject.keywordstochastic environmentsen
dc.titleSignaling in Deterministic and Stochastic Settings-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn654799458en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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