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dc.contributor.authorSalim, Claudiaen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T08:56:37Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T08:56:37Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37330-
dc.description.abstractWe present the idea that quality cooperation and standardisation might raise network providers' incentives for product differentiation. As a result, the equilibrium outcome may be characterised by voluntary standardisation and maximum quality differentiation: This situation arises, if platforms compete in prices, but coordinate their quality provision, while the cost of quality provision is rather low. The result implies that firms might jointly agree to quality differences in order to offset consumers' taste for variety. Collusive qualities and standardization are socially more desirable than exclusivity with regard to investments. Nevertheless, quality competition and standardisation achieves the highest investments and maximum welfare.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Two-Sided Markets and Vertical Restraints |xE8-V1en
dc.subject.jelD43en
dc.subject.jelD62en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordtwo-sided marketsen
dc.subject.keywordstandardsen
dc.subject.keywordcollusionen
dc.subject.keywordinvestment in transaction qualityen
dc.titlePlatform Standards, Collusion and Quality Incentives-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn655724893en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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