Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37287 
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dc.contributor.authorBauer, Christianen
dc.contributor.authorLingens, Jörgen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T08:53:22Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T08:53:22Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37287-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the welfare and employment effects of different wage bargaining regimes. Within the large firm search model, we show that collective bargaining affects employment via two channels. Collective bargaining exerts opposing effects on job creation and wage setting. Firms have a stronger incentive for strategic employment, while workers benefit from the threat of a strike. We find that the employment increase due to the strategic motive is dominated by the employment decrease due to the increase in workers' threat point. In aggregate equilibrium, employment is ineffciently low under collective bargaining. But it is not always true that equilibrium wages exceed those under individual bargaining. If unemployment benefits are suffciently low, collectively bargained wages are smaller. The theory sheds new light on policies concerned with strategic employment and the relation between replacement rates and the extent of collective wage bargaining.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Wages: Bargaining and Minimum Wage |xD19-V1en
dc.subject.jelJ30en
dc.subject.jelJ50en
dc.subject.jelJ41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordsearchen
dc.subject.keywordoveremploymenten
dc.subject.keywordcollective wage bargainingen
dc.subject.keywordwage determinationen
dc.titleIndividual vs. Collective Bargaining in the Large Firm Search Model-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn655943382en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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