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dc.contributor.authorChlaß, Nadineen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T08:56:32Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T08:56:32Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37253-
dc.description.abstractGames of imperfect information distribute information unevenly amongst parties. Recently, parties have been claimed to hold preferences purely over such procedural aspects. Here, I explore the impact purely procedural preferences exert if agents are without influence on the procedure itself. I design a game of imperfect information which exhibits extreme procedural asymmetry in that several procedural aspects advantage one and the same party over another. In an experimental test, parties are found to monetarily compensate the asymmetry such that almost no winner's curse results. I explain the compensation by an instrument for purely procedural preferences (Chlaß et al. 2009). The residual winner's curse links to personality traits. The game abstracts a management buy-in, the natural counterpart to a management buy-out.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Experimental Game Theory |xF13-V1en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelD63en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordprocedural preferencesen
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen
dc.subject.keywordwinner's curseen
dc.titleThe Impact of Procedural Asymmetry in Games of Imperfect Information-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn655741291en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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