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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37204
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Buck, Florian | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-08-11T08:56:35Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-08-11T08:56:35Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37204 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This article provides a theoretical framework to analyze the impact of banking regulation on the risk-taking behavior of banks by incorporatig the incentives of three risk-neutral agents - the welfaristic regulator, the shareholder and the manager. While shareholders are assumed to maximize the discounted flow of bank profits, bank managers maximize expected income choosing from a menu of portfolios with different risk-return profiles. We show under which conditions capital requirements intensify the agency conflict between shareholders and bank managers if complete contracts are impossible. As a result, a government interested in alleviating this divergence will incorporate capital requirements to curb risk-appetite only in those cases in which managerial myopia and the probability of default in the banking-sector are not substantial. Moreover, our model suggests that direct regulation of a manager's bonus system is a substitute for any form of capital requirements. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M. | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Banking Regulation: Liquidity and Regulatory Capital |xA7-V3 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G28 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G38 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G30 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Subprime Crisis | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Banking regulation | en |
dc.title | Managerial Prudence under Banking Regulation | - |
dc.type | Conference Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 655736670 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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