Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37036 
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dc.contributor.authorKräkel, Matthiasen
dc.date.accessioned2009-12-09-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-29T10:08:55Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-29T10:08:55Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37036-
dc.description.abstractWe show that in competitive careers based on individual performance the least productive individuals may have the highest probabilities to be promoted to top positions. These individuals have the lowest fall-back positions and, hence, the highest incentives to succeed in career contests. This detrimental incentive effect exists irrespective of whether effort and talent are substitutes or complements in the underlying contest-success function. However, in case of complements the incentive effect may be be outweighed by a productivity effect that favors high effort choices by the more talented individualen
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x25/2009en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelJ44en
dc.subject.jelJ45en
dc.subject.jelM51en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcareer competitionen
dc.subject.keywordcontesten
dc.subject.keywordmediocracyen
dc.subject.stwErwerbsverlaufen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwExtensives Spielen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsproduktivitäten
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleCompetitive Careers as a Way to Mediocracy-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn614621259en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:252009-

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