Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/36480 
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dc.contributor.authorLessmann, Christianen
dc.contributor.authorMarkwardt, Guntheren
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-01-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-15T09:39:22Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-15T09:39:22Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/36480-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines whether the federal structure of aid-receiving countries matters in explaining aid effectiveness. Following the decentralization theorem, the devolution of powers should increase aid effectiveness, since local decision-makers are better informed about local needs. At the same time, decentralization has reverse effects, e.g., through coordination problems, excessive regulation, administrative costs and local capture. Using panel data for up to 59 countries, we find that aid is less effective or even harmful in decentralized countries. Our results imply that donor countries should carefully consider how both anti-poverty instruments financial assistance and decentralization work together.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aTechnische Universität Dresden, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften |cDresdenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics |x09/09en
dc.subject.jelO1en
dc.subject.jelO2en
dc.subject.jelO4en
dc.subject.jelH7en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordForeign Aiden
dc.subject.keywordGrowthen
dc.subject.keywordDecentralizationen
dc.titleAid, growth and decentralization-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn603457878en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:tuddps:0909en

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