Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32634 
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dc.contributor.authorDoghmi, Ahmeden
dc.contributor.authorKobihy, Miloudien
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-06-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-20T14:34:37Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-20T14:34:37Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32634-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we introduce the concept of payoff distortion in the standard prisoner's dilemma game when strategies are driven by psychological behaviors. This concept enables to take account each player's assessment of the other player's behavior and the asymmetry of information. We determine the conditions which allow that mutual cooperation constitutes the equilibrium. we particularly focus on the reciprocity in case of complete and incomplete information about the payoff distortion. We show that mutual cooperation is a Nash equilibrium with complete information and is a Bayesian equilibrium when each player believes that his opponent behaves with 'large' reciprocity in incomplete information environment.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2009,072en
dc.subject.jelC7en
dc.subject.jelA13en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordReciprocityen
dc.subject.keywordBehavioren
dc.subject.keywordCooperationen
dc.subject.keywordprisoner's dilemma gameen
dc.subject.stwGefangenendilemmaen
dc.subject.stwAustauschtheorieen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOn reciprocal behavior in prisoner dilemma game-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn610033824en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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