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dc.contributor.authorBruttel, Lisa V.en
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren
dc.contributor.authorKamecke, Ulrichen
dc.contributor.authorPopova, Veraen
dc.date.accessioned2009-04-28-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:12:44Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:12:44Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31715-
dc.description.abstractUnlike previous attempts to implement cooperation in a prisoners' dilemma game with an infinite horizon in the laboratory, we focus on extended prisoners' dilemma games in which a second (pure strategy) equilibrium allows for voluntary cooperation in all but the last round. Our four main experimental treatments distinguish long versus short horizon and strict versus non-strict additional equilibrium compared to the control treatment, a standard prisoners' dilemma. Quite surprisingly, according to our results, only a strict additional equilibrium increases cooperation rate for a given time horizon. As expected a longer time horizon promotes cooperation.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2009,030en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordFolk theoremen
dc.subject.keywordFinite horizonen
dc.subject.keywordPrisoners' dilemmaen
dc.subject.keywordExperimenten
dc.subject.stwGefangenendilemmaen
dc.subject.stwKooperationen
dc.subject.stwExtensives Spielen
dc.subject.stwFolk-Theoremen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleVoluntary cooperation based on equilibrium retribution: an experiment testing finite-horizon folk theorems-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn598703527en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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