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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Bruttel, Lisa V. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Güth, Werner | en |
dc.contributor.author | Kamecke, Ulrich | en |
dc.contributor.author | Popova, Vera | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-04-28 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-14T11:12:44Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-05-14T11:12:44Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31715 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Unlike previous attempts to implement cooperation in a prisoners' dilemma game with an infinite horizon in the laboratory, we focus on extended prisoners' dilemma games in which a second (pure strategy) equilibrium allows for voluntary cooperation in all but the last round. Our four main experimental treatments distinguish long versus short horizon and strict versus non-strict additional equilibrium compared to the control treatment, a standard prisoners' dilemma. Quite surprisingly, according to our results, only a strict additional equilibrium increases cooperation rate for a given time horizon. As expected a longer time horizon promotes cooperation. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJena | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aJena Economic Research Papers |x2009,030 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C73 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C91 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Folk theorem | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Finite horizon | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Prisoners' dilemma | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Experiment | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gefangenendilemma | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kooperation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Extensives Spiel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Folk-Theorem | en |
dc.subject.stw | Test | en |
dc.title | Voluntary cooperation based on equilibrium retribution: an experiment testing finite-horizon folk theorems | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 598703527 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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