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dc.contributor.authorHerold, Katharinaen
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-27-
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-28T14:21:59Z-
dc.date.available2010-01-28T14:21:59Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/29692-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyses and compares the efficiency of alternative incentive compatible grant schemes under asymmetric information relieving subnational governments of excessive debt burden. They allow intervention into local debt, local tax or complete local fiscal policy. In the first case, separation of types can be induced by forcing recipients to inefficient high borrowing and in the second case by imposing inefficient high tax rates. In the last case, fiscal policy of the recipient region is distorted in the period of the exogenous shock. We show that constraining complete financial autonomy leads to the lowest welfare losses. This is due to the fact that complete regulation of local fiscal policy reduces the incentive of contributing local governments to defect from truthful relevation.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFinanzwissenschaftliches Forschungsinstitut an der Universität zu Köln (FiFo Köln) |cKöln en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aFiFo-CPE Discussion Paper |x09-2en
dc.subject.jelH74en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordvertical transfersen
dc.subject.keywordsubnational debten
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric information adverse selectionen
dc.subject.keywordfinancial autonomyen
dc.subject.stwFinanzausgleichen
dc.subject.stwFinanzföderalismusen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Schuldenen
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken
dc.subject.stwTeilstaaten
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwAdverse Selectionen
dc.subject.stwSelbstverwaltungen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleIntergovernmental grants and financial autonomy under asymmetric information-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn617280932en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:uoccpe:092en

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