Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/256948 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] Economies [ISSN:] 2227-7099 [Volume:] 7 [Issue:] 1 [Article No.:] 16 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 1-17
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
Pork-barrel spending is the use of federal money for localized projects that yield only a narrow geographic benefit. It is a commonly held belief that politicians use this spending to improve their chances of re-election. One way that an incumbent can increase their chances of re-election is through increased fundraising. Political entrepreneurs see this opportunity and attempt to benefit from these projects in exchange for campaign contributions. This paper investigates whether incumbents are able to use their position to bolster their campaign contributions. I find pork-barrel spending and political contributions to be positively related, but this effect is only present when the incumbent properly times the project. I also find that general federal appropriations do not have the same impact. This supports the claim that pork-barrel spending can be used as a currency in the marketplace for political capital.
Subjects: 
pork-barrel spending
campaign finance
incumbency advantage
elections
JEL: 
D72
H50
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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