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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2007,100
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
Private banks often blame state guarantees to distort competition by giving public banks the advantage of lower funding costs. In this paper I show that if borrowers perceive the public bank as supporting economic development, private banks may be able to separate firms by self selection, enter the market, and obtain profits in equilibrium despite their cost disadvantage. The public bank’s competitive advantage may be offset, independently of what its true objective function is. Even perfect competition between private banks does not lead to zero profits.
Schlagwörter: 
public banks
state guarantee
self-selection
JEL: 
G21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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