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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Chaudhuri, Ananish | en |
dc.contributor.author | Chen, DeeDee | en |
dc.contributor.author | Graziano, Sara | en |
dc.contributor.author | McIntire, Frances | en |
dc.contributor.author | Winkler, Dawn | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-29T15:50:57Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-29T15:50:57Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2003 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23220 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We study a public goods game where subjects get feedback either continually or intermittently. We find that the intermittent feedback helps to mitigate problems of free riding because subjects in this treatment focus more on a string of choices rather than deciding on a case by case basis as in the continuous feedback treatment. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aWellesley College, Department of Economics |cWellesley, MA | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWellesley College Working Paper |x2003-02 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C92 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C91 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Public Goods ; Voluntary Contributions Mechanism ; Patterned Feedback ; Free riding ; Expectations | en |
dc.subject.stw | Öffentliches Gut | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Trittbrettfahrerverhalten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Experiment | en |
dc.title | To free ride or not to free ride? Role of patterning and feedback in the public goods game | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 378805673 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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