Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23091 
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dc.contributor.authorKirstein, Annetteen
dc.contributor.authorKirstein, Rolanden
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:36:25Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:36:25Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23091-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we experimentally test a theory of boundedly rational behavior in a "lemons market." We analyzed two different market designs, for which perfect rationality implies complete and partial market collapse, respectively. Our empirical observations deviate substantially from these predictions of rational choice theory: Even after 20 repetitions, the actual outcome is closer to efficiency than expected. Our bounded rationality approach to explaining these observations starts with the insight that perfect rationality would require the players to perform an infinite number of iterative reasoning steps. Boundedly rational players, however, carry out only a limited number of such iterations. We have determined the iteration type of the players independently from their market behavior. A significant correlation exists between the iteration types and the observed price offers.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE) |cSaarbrückenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCSLE Discussion Paper |x2004-02 [rev.]en
dc.subject.jelD8en
dc.subject.jelC7en
dc.subject.jelB4en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordguessing gamesen
dc.subject.keywordbeauty contestsen
dc.subject.keywordmarket failureen
dc.subject.keywordadverse selectionen
dc.subject.keywordlemon problemen
dc.subject.keywordregulatory failureen
dc.subject.keywordpaternalistic regulationen
dc.subject.stwMarktmechanismusen
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwAdverse Selectionen
dc.subject.stwBeschränkte Rationalitäten
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwExperimenten
dc.titleLess Rationality, More Efficiency: a Laboratory Experiment on "Lemons" Markets-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn822203642en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:csledp:200402ren

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