Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22932
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dc.contributor.authorSchmitz, Patrick W.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:08Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:08Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22932-
dc.description.abstractRecent work in the field of mechanism design has led some researchers to propose institutional changes that would permit parties to enter into nonmodifiable contracts, which is not possible under current contract law. This paper demonstrates that it may well be socially desirable not to enforce contractual terms that explicitly prevent renegotiation, even if rational and symmetrically informed parties have deliberately signed such a contract. The impossibility to prevent renegotiation can constrain the principal?s abilities to introduce distortions in order to reduce the agent?s rent, so that the first-best benchmark solution will more often be attained.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2005,26en_US
dc.subject.jelK12en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordContract modificationen_US
dc.subject.keywordRenegotiationen_US
dc.subject.keywordMoral hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwVertragstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwVertragsrechten_US
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleShould Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn500985758en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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