Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22932 
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dc.contributor.authorSchmitz, Patrick W.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:08Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:08Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22932-
dc.description.abstractRecent work in the field of mechanism design has led some researchers to propose institutional changes that would permit parties to enter into nonmodifiable contracts, which is not possible under current contract law. This paper demonstrates that it may well be socially desirable not to enforce contractual terms that explicitly prevent renegotiation, even if rational and symmetrically informed parties have deliberately signed such a contract. The impossibility to prevent renegotiation can constrain the principal’s abilities to introduce distortions in order to reduce the agent’s rent, so that the first-best benchmark solution will more often be attained.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x26/2005en
dc.subject.jelK12en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordContract modificationen
dc.subject.keywordRenegotiationen
dc.subject.keywordMoral hazarden
dc.subject.stwVertragstheorieen
dc.subject.stwVertragsrechten
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleShould Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn500985758en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:262005-

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