Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22898 
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dc.contributor.authorJost, Peter-Jürgenen
dc.contributor.authorKräkel, Matthiasen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:49Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:49Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22898-
dc.description.abstractRank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequential. We show that agents’ strategic behavior in sequential-move tournaments significantly differ from the one in simultaneous-move tournaments: In a sequential-move tournament with heterogeneous agents, there may be either a first-mover or a second-mover advantage. Under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. The principal is able to prevent preemptive behavior in equilibrium, but he will not implement first-best efforts although the agents are risk neutral.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x21/2004en
dc.subject.jelM5en
dc.subject.jelM12en
dc.subject.jelJ3en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpreemptionen
dc.subject.keywordtournamentsen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwTournamenten
dc.titlePreemptive Behavior in Sequential-Move Tournaments with Heterogeneous Agents-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn473006049en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:212004-

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