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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Bös, Dieter | en |
dc.contributor.author | Kolmar, Martin | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-29T15:10:13Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-29T15:10:13Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2003 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22835 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper we deal with voluntary and compulsory redistribution in an economy where the enforcement of property rights is costly. Two agents engage in a common-pool contest and two types of potential distortions arise: the waste of resources in the contest and the dilution of incentives to produce as a result of the existens of externalities in the conflict equilibrium. We were able to show the following results: (i) In some situations Pareto-improving redistribution occurs voluntarily. (ii) Otherwise, the government may choose an indirect way to improve production in the presence of appropriation: In a situation of partial anarchy in some market redistributive policies in other markets may help to reduce the inefficiency in the anarchic market. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x2/2003 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D30 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D74 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D23 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Anarchy | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Contests | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Redistribution | en |
dc.subject.stw | Einkommensumverteilung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verteilungskonflikt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Eigentumsrechtstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Anarchie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Aggressiveness and Redistribution | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 374458871 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:bonedp:22003 | - |
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