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dc.contributor.authorPenov, Ivanen_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates a local problem of common pool resources (CPR), the solutionof which needs a balance between the collective and private interests. In the politicalcontext we have a large group of actors with a short planning horizon and a lack of trustamong them. CPR provision is organised in a centralised way. The state enforcementmechanism is weak and cannot protect the individuals or eventually back the collectivedecisions. The above problem is investigated in the case of irrigation in Bulgaria wherewater usage declined by nearly 85% during the period of transition. In addition, largeparts of the existing canal systems were abandoned. Three groups of institutional optionsare investigated in the paper: improvement of the local level co-ordination; limitingthe market imperfections, and strengthening the external conflict resolution andsanctioning mechanisms. The investigation of the above case led the author to conclusionsthat can be generalised for the case of CPR management during the period of transition.The transition process is not just a process of transferring western institutions toEastern Europe, but also a process of spontaneous emerging of new institutions at locallevel. Therefore, we call for state intervention, not in the area of CPR provision, but insupporting local co-ordination.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCEESA discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität Berlin, Department of Agricultural Economics and Social Sciences |x2004,2en_US
dc.titleInstitutional options for sustainable irrigation : an evidence from Bulgariaen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US

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