Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Full metadata record
|dc.description.abstract||Water for irrigation and irrigation infrastructure are both common pool resources, due totheir low excludability and high rivalry. The well-known common pool resource dilemmais often the consequence. Collective action may be a way how societies canovercome this dilemma. First results from a three-month empirical field study in Bulgariaare presented trying to explain how actor groups characteristics, such as lack oftrust between community members and effective institutional settings at the local level,such as information asymmetry, limited sanctioning and enforcement mechanisms andalmost no monitoring mechanisms provide conditions under which opportunistic behaviourdominates. The effective rules-in-use in local communities are presented. The simplestexample is watering crops without paying the water price. Individuals will usetheir power to maintain their opportunistic strategies and, consequently, they will notagree to any rule change. Moreover, the actors` attitude towards collective action is verypessimistic. This has a crucial impact on the evolving of credible commitment which isone prerequisite for collective action. The effects on water management can be severeand the common pool resource dilemma situation may continue. This article questions ifthere are additional influencing variables inherited from the transformation process thatwill have an impact on the institutional change and constrain the emergence of collectiveaction solutions. The discussion is based on empirical material from Varbiza villagein the south of Bulgaria.||en_US|
|dc.relation.ispartofseries|||aCEESA discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität Berlin, Department of Agricultural Economics and Social Sciences |x5||en_US|
|dc.title||Constraints for collective action in Bulgaria´s irrigation sector||en_US|
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.