Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18281 
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dc.contributor.authorBorck, Rainalden
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:40:33Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:40:33Z-
dc.date.issued2002-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18281-
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows that stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion. Individuals vote on a linear income tax which is used to finance lump sum transfers. Stricter enforcement may make redistributive taxation more attractive to the decisive voter. The tax rate and transfer may rise which in turn may increase tax evasion. An example shows that this result can actually occur. The paper also discusses the interaction between voting on taxes and the choice of audit rate by a budget maximizing bureaucrat.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW Discussion Papers |x297en
dc.subject.jelH26en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordTax evasionen
dc.subject.keywordenforcementen
dc.subject.keywordvotingen
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteueren
dc.subject.stwFinanzverwaltungen
dc.subject.stwSteuerliche Betriebsprüfungen
dc.subject.stwSteuerstraftaten
dc.subject.stwSozialtransferen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleStricter enforcement may increase tax evasion-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn848984102en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp297en

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