Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18126
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dc.contributor.authorBorck, Rainalden_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:39:33Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:39:33Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18126-
dc.description.abstractThe paper presents a model where public pensions are determined by majorityvoting. Voters differ by age and income. Moreover, life expectancy increases withincome. Depending on the strength of the link between contributions and benefits,and the relationship between income and life expectancy, individually optimal taxrates may increase or decrease with income. If they decrease, high tax rates aresupported by pensioners and poor workers. If they increase with income, the coalitionfor high tax rates consists of pensioners and rich workers. `Ends against the middle'equilibria are also possible.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW Discussion Papers |x369en_US
dc.subject.jelH55en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordVotingen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic pensionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordlife expectancyen_US
dc.subject.stwGesetzliche Rentenversicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommenen_US
dc.subject.stwSterblichkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOn the choice of public pensions when income and life expectancy are correlateden_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn850975913en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp369en_US

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