Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18104 
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dc.contributor.authorPflüger, Michaelen
dc.contributor.authorBorck, Rainalden
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:39:24Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:39:24Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18104-
dc.description.abstractTax competition for a mobile factor is different in 'new economic geography set- tings' compared to standard tax competition models. The agglomeration rent which accrues to the mobile factor in the core region can be taxed. Moreover, a tax differential between the core and the periphery can be maintained. The present paper reexamines this issue in a setting which, in addition to the core-periphery equilibria, exhibits stable equilibria with partial agglomeration. We show that a tax differential may arise as an equilibrium of the tax game even when there is only partial agglomeration and the mobile factor does not derive an agglomeration rent.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW Discussion Papers |x408en
dc.subject.jelH73en
dc.subject.jelF22en
dc.subject.jelF15en
dc.subject.jelR12en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordEconomic Geographyen
dc.subject.keywordAgglomerationen
dc.subject.keywordTax Competitionen
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben
dc.subject.stwKern-Peripherie-Beziehungen
dc.subject.stwAgglomerationseffekten
dc.subject.stwNeue ökonomische Geographieen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleAgglomeration and tax competition-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn383007089en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp408en

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