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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Haller, Hans | en |
dc.contributor.author | Sarangi, Sudipta | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:39:11Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:39:11Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2003 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18073 | - |
dc.description.abstract | A non-cooperative model of network formation is developed. Agents form links with others based on the cost of the link and its assessed benefit. Link formation is one-sided, i.e., agents can initiate links with other agents without their consent, provided the agent forming the link makes the appropriate investment. Information flow is two-way. The model builds on the work of Bala and Goyal, but allows for agent heterogeneity. Whereas they permit links to fail with a certain common probability, in our model the probability of failure can be different for different links. We investigate Nash networks that exhibit connectedness and super-connectedness. We provide an explicit characterization of certain star networks. Efficiency and Pareto-optimality issues are discussed through examples. We explore alternative model specifications to address potential shortcomings. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlin | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aDIW Discussion Papers |x337 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D83 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.stw | Soziales Netzwerk | en |
dc.subject.stw | Informationsverbreitung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Nash-Gleichgewicht | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Nash Networks with Heterogeneous Agents | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 849708540 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp337 | en |
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