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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/63370
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Chu, Ke-young | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-09-21T09:31:14Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-09-21T09:31:14Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.isbn | 929190662X | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63370 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Findings of cross-cultural psychology suggest that different approaches to rule enforcement have cultural roots. Individualist societies have established a rule of law, in which rules prevail; collectivist societies have a rule of man, which allows discretionary rule enforcement, which, in turn, is recognized as an obstacle to sustained increases in productive long-term investment in developing countries. This paper presents a model that offers a unified framework to explain rule enforcement as social optimization processes in both individualist and collectivist societies and, on this basis, highlights the essential differences between a rule of law and a rule man (i.e., between rules and discretion). The paper uses this framework to show that cross-country variations in rule enforcement are explained to a considerable extent by cultural values. The paper then uses the framework to show how the imported multi-stage rule enforcement institutions based on separation of powers in vertically-oriented collectivist societies, unlike in the individualist societies from which they originate, might not ensure as low a degree of discretion as intended. Finally, the paper uses these results to explore practical ideas that would help collectivist societies benefit from rule enforcement with low discretion. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aThe United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) |cHelsinki | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWIDER Research Paper |x2004/65 | en |
dc.subject.jel | K00 | en |
dc.subject.jel | O17 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | rule of law | en |
dc.subject.keyword | rule of man | en |
dc.subject.keyword | collectivism | en |
dc.subject.keyword | discretion | en |
dc.subject.keyword | enforcement | en |
dc.subject.keyword | individualism | en |
dc.subject.keyword | institutions | en |
dc.subject.keyword | rules | en |
dc.subject.stw | Rechtsökonomik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Entwicklung | en |
dc.title | A model of a rule of law and a rule of man: Implications for the design of institutions | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 477336655 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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