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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Jeitschko, Thomas D. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Wolfstetter, Elmar | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-09-07T15:38:47Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-09-07T15:38:47Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 1999 | - |
dc.identifier.pi | urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10047229 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62158 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. The market game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the well-known static optimum, and sketch the impact of information spillovers. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aHumboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes |cBerlin | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aSFB 373 Discussion Paper |x2000,18 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D44 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | auctions | en |
dc.subject.keyword | procurement | en |
dc.title | Auctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 723718679 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200018 | en |
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